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A European Social Model of  State-Market Relations*
The Ethics of Competition from a “Neo-liberal” Perspective 
MICHAEL WOHLGEMUTH**
Ein Europäisches Sozialmodell der Beziehungen zwischen Staat und Markt – 
Die Ethik des Wettbewerbs aus ‚neo-liberaler’ Sicht 
In this paper I portray „neo-liberalism“ in its original conceptual meaning as opposed to the generic 
term of depreciation as which it is commonly used. I identify fair competition and the denial of all 
privilege as the major concerns of original neo-liberals. Ethical merit for competition might, at first 
sight, be based on only two principles: individual natural rights (equal liberty) and socially desirable 
outcomes (“unintended altruism”). It was the neo-liberal idea to put fairness-norms or universally 
applicable rules of just behaviour between an unqualified “input-based” ethics and an unqualified 
“output-based” ethical consequentialism. The enforcement of such rules is a major obligation of the 
state. Today, the European Union assumes the role of “guardian” of competition. In a certain, but 
limited sense, neo-liberalism, correctly understood, can be argued to be the one founding “European 
Social Model”. However, beyond the realm of core of common, universalisable interests, competition 
amongst social-political models seems a preferable option for Europe. 
Keywords: Neo-liberalism, Ordo-liberalism, European Social Models, Ethics of Competition  
1. Introduction: the spectre of neo-liberalism 
The Communist Manifesto, published in 1848, opens with these dramatic lines: 
“A spectre is haunting Europe – the spectre of Communism. All the Powers of 
old Europe have entered into a holy alliance to exorcise this spectre: Pope and 
Czar, Metternich and Guizot, French Radicals and German police-spies. Where is 
the party in opposition that has not been decried as Communistic by its oppo-
nents in power? Where the Opposition that has not hurled back the branding re-
proach of Communism, against the more advanced opposition parties, as well as 
against its reactionary adversaries? Two things result from this fact: I. Commu-
nism is already acknowledged by all European Powers to be itself a Power. II. It is 
high time that Communists should openly, in the face of the whole world, publish 
their views, their aims, their tendencies, and meet this nursery tale of the Spectre 
of Communism with a Manifesto of the party itself.” (Engels/Marx 1848/2005: 1) 
________________________ 
*  The article has been subject to a double blind peer review process. Date of submission: 6th 
September, 2007; revisited version accepted for publication: 14th September, 2008. 
**  PD Dr. Michael Wohlgemuth, Walter Eucken Institut, Goethestrasse 10, D-79100 Freiburg, 
Germany, phone: +49-(0)761-79097 10, fax: +49-(0)761-79097-97, e-mail: wohlgemuth@walter-
eucken-institut.de, fields of expertise: new institutional economics, public choice, Austrian market 
process-theory. The author wishes to thank two anonymous referees for very useful criticism. 
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150 years later, the spectre of Communism has been mostly dispelled. In its place a 
new spectre is today haunting “old Europe”: Neo-liberalism. If one replaces the word 
“Communism” with “Neo-liberalism”, Marx’s quote offers a rather accurate descrip-
tion of today’s political and intellectual climate. Today, neo-liberalism serves as a 
“branding reproach” that helps enormously in discrediting political adversaries of all 
sides. The effect of this branding is that no one today wants to be “neo-liberal” and 
that there is in fact no 21st century neo-liberal “Manifesto of the party itself”. 
In this paper, I offer no such Manifesto either, but rather an account of well estab-
lished historical ordo- or neo-liberal views concerning state-market relations with 
special emphasis on the role of competition and the ethical value that has been, and 
still can be, attached to it. I start with a short account of the history of ideas of original 
neo-liberalism and the perhaps surprisingly active role self-declared neo-liberals at-
tached to the state (parts 2 and 3). Part 4 presents several ethical vindications of open, 
competitive markets stressed by neo-liberals: equal liberty, procedural justice, reduc-
tion of private (and state) power and the unintended, but effective, “altruism” of 
consequences. Part 5 describes a few central legal-institutional implications of this 
view and part 6 offers a rough assessment of neo-liberal elements to be found on a 
European Union level. Part 7 concludes with a plea for an equally open and rules-
based competition amongst social models in Europe.  
2. A short history of neo-liberalism 
Many commentators see neo-liberalism as a right-wing Anglo-Saxon capitalist con-
spiracy that somehow invented globalisation, privatisation and unfettered markets, 
thus implying that neo-liberalism was an ideology of the 1980s, fostered by a few 
powerful politicians such as Margret Thatcher or Ronald Reagan who were instructed 
by a few spin-professors such as Milton Friedman or Friedrich von Hayek (see e.g. 
Klein 2007 or Chomsky 1999). The actual history of neo-liberalism is, however, 
dramatically different. 
Neo-liberalism was invented in Paris, France, Europe. And the year was 1938. At that 
time, the spectre of totalitarianism was, in fact, haunting our continent. Liberalism was 
dead; fascism and communism were the dominant beliefs in politics and, even more 
so, amongst intellectuals and clerks in Europe at that time. Both a sense of failed and 
misconceived “old”, “classical” or “laissez-faire” liberalism and the imminent threat 
that totalitarianism posed to European civilisation led to a first (and for many years, 
last) meeting of some 25 intellectuals who still believed in the virtue of individual 
liberty. These intellectuals took it upon themselves to re-assess liberalism as a political 
programme for a most troubling future. Historians of ideas know the event as the 
“Colloque Lippmann”. Jacques Rueff invited scholars from Europe (German and 
Austrian participants had to come from exile) to discuss the need for a “rénovation du 
libéralisme”, beginning with challenging ideas just published by Walter Lippmann in 
his book on The Good Society (Lippmann 1938). Among those attending who are still 
known today were: Raymond Aron, Friedrich von Hayek, Ludwig von Mises, Michael 
Polanyi, Wilhelm Röpke, Louis Rougier, and Alexander Rüstow.  
Walter Lippmann, in his opening address, defined the purpose of the meeting to be 
the need to find a common intellectual basis for anti-totalitarianism. In his view, it 
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would be useless to try to “reaffirm and resurrect the formulas of 19th century liberal-
ism”, since the old doctrine and/or its political realisation had laid the causes for its 
own decline. The old doctrine had allowed “monopoly capitalism” to discredit the 
market economy and to thus distort a “synthesis of order and liberty”. Hence, accord-
ing to Lippmann, liberalism would have to be rebuilt, not merely renovated (Colloque 
Lippmann 1938: 20 and 27)1. During the ensuing discussion, only Mises defended 
“liberalism” without any qualifications – or, as he put it, concessions to the totalitarian 
fashions of the time (ibid.: 31). Most other discussants seemed more than ready to be 
rid of any allegiance to “old”, “laissez-faire” or “Manchester”-liberalism, and rallied 
around the flag of “néo-libéralisme” (ibid.: 7).  
The Colloque went on to discuss the following issues: 
(1) The endogenous reasons for the decline of liberalism (with Wilhelm Röpke 
giving the opening statement and identifying market concentration and limited 
liability as such endogenous reasons), 
(2) liberalism and economic nationalism (with, again, Röpke setting the agenda by 
refuting all economic justifications of imperialism), 
(3) liberalism and the social question (with Jacques Rueff identifying price-fixing 
and market interventions as major causes of social misery), and 
(4) exogenous (psychological) reasons for liberalism’s decline (with Alexander 
Rüstow blaming capitalism and industrialisation for alienating the people and 
leading to soulless mass-societies). 
During the Paris discussions only one year before the outbreak of World War II, the 
brave rest of liberals was surely united in its rejection of totalitarianism. But what is 
more noteworthy from today’s perspective is that most participants held old economic 
liberalism accountable for its own decline. The task, as they saw it, was to safeguard 
ethical values such as individual dignity, liberty and responsibility, inter-individual 
justice and global peace. To defend these “old” classical liberal values, a “new” politi-
cal programme and economic order – a new definition of state-market-relations – was 
deemed necessary.  
I will try to sketch some basic aspects of this “new order” in due course. To end my 
account of the historical roots of “neo-liberalism” and to highlight the irony of history 
displayed in today’s attacks on neo-liberalism from proponents of both left and right 
let me quote from the final session of the Colloque. The term “neo-liberalism” was 
not undisputed. Some participants wanted to make more explicit exactly what it was 
that was “neo”. Proposals ranged from “libéralisme positif” (since “old” liberalism 
would too readily content itself with “negative” denotations of individual rights) to 
“libéralisme sociale” (since the benefits of a free society would far better serve social 
goals than those of socialist planning). Jacques Rueff offered his view by naming it 
“liberal politics of the left, because it tends to give the least advantaged classes the 
________________________ 
1  All following quotes from the discussions of the “Colloque” are translated from the French 
publication that the author intends to soon publish in English. See also Plickert (2008) for an ac-
count of the Colloque and the ensuing development of various strands of neo-liberalism until to-
day.
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most well-being possible” (ibid.: 101)!2 So much about the historical, profoundly 
European, roots of neo-liberalism. 
3. Open market, strong state: the neo-/ordo-liberal view 
The “Colloque” did, in the end, produce something like a neo-liberal agenda, which 
however, as a consensus-longing paper (written by Walter Lippmann), clearly had to 
be less controversial and substantial than the discourse that preceded it (ibid.: 99-101). 
A much more concise neo-liberal programme was meanwhile being developed, as a 
more or less openly anti-totalitarian plot, in Germany.  
Members of the Freiburg School of Law and Economics had begun in the earlier 
1930s and even more so during the Nazi regime (in various resistance circles3) to 
develop principles of a “workable and humane order” (Eucken 1952/1990: 14) of 
society that later became known as “ordo-liberalism” – an economic, legal and moral 
programme that would, after the collapse of Nazi-Germany, provide major inspira-
tions for the German “economic miracle” based on an economic constitution labelled 
“social market economy”4. The two exiled German attendants of the “Colloque” – 
Röpke and Rüstow, who during their life-times had no problem to call themselves 
“neo-liberals” – had a comparable impact on the policies of Ludwig Erhard, the 
political entrepreneur who pushed through free prices and competition at a time when 
such policies were deemed extremely daring. Röpke, Rüstow and Erhard shared views 
very similar to those of Walter Eucken and Franz Böhm, founders of the Freiburg 
School. From a history of ideas perspective, it is certainly fascinating to mark and 
highlight methodological and political differences among different authors. But re-
garding fundamental ideas, and compared with the general trend of thinking at the 
time, the neo-liberalism of Röpke and Rüstow and the ordo-liberalism of the Freiburg 
School can reasonably be viewed as ventures of a common cause. 5
________________________ 
2  In response to Rueff’s proposal, one participant (Louis Marlio) argued that the party-political 
dimensions of “right” or “left” were of no use in locating (neo-)liberal positions (Colloque 
Lippmann 1938: 102). Collectivism vs. individualism would be much more adequate criteria. 
Hayek’s contributions to the Colloque were only rarely kept due to the fact that only French and 
German interventions were recorded by dactylography and Hayek’s English statements had to be 
reconstructed from memory. One can image, however, that he would have sided with Marlio. His 
famous “Road to Serfdom” (Hayek 1944) was, after all, dedicated “[t]o the socialists in all par-
ties”.
3  See Goldschmidt (2005) for more details. 
4  See Goldschmidt/Wohlgemuth (2008a) on the theoretical sources of the German concept of a 
“Social Market Economy”. 
5  See Peacock/Willgerodt (1989) or Goldschmidt/Wohlgemuth (2008b) for collections and 
interpretations of original texts of the authors just mentioned. Indeed, their common cause is not 
identical in all details of defining a “just” order nor is the argument put forward with identical 
methodological means. One can distinguish rather romantic-conservative humanistic ideals de-
veloped within a broad sociological framework by Rüstow and Röpke from the rather pragmatic 
political demands that Eucken or Böhm based on economic systems analysis combined with the 
interdependent legal and political orders needed to ensure a workable and just social order (see 
Renner 2002). Differences between Hayek’s more Humeian evolutionary approach and Eucken’s 
more Kantian constructivistic approach can only be hinted at in this paper (see Streit/Wohlge-
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Their common cause was to establish order – an economic and legal order that serves 
in the first instance not economic efficiency but rather individual liberty and social 
inclusion. Eucken and Böhm identified the “new social question” as that of unequal 
market power based on privileges of powerful economic groups with special access to 
state power. The old laissez-faire liberalism, they argued, had created a situation where 
cartels and monopolies (tolerated or even supported by state agencies) were exercising 
unwarranted and unjust power over consumers and potential competitors. A new 
liberalism would have to be one in which such power-relations based on privileges 
had to be dismantled. In other words, and as echoed in the Colloque’s session on the 
endogenous reasons for the decline of liberalism (Colloque Lippmann 1938: 25-45), a 
free market economy cannot in and of itself create its own ethical and institutional 
preconditions; it tends to become a closed circle for the powerful privileged instead of 
an open opportunity for the industrious individual. 
Hence the call for a “strong state” (Eucken 1932: 319). Its strength was not to be 
derived from interventionist powers or a paternalistic, all-embracing care for the 
economy and society at large. Quite to the contrary, the “strong state” envisioned by 
the Freiburg “neo-liberals” gains its strength rather through self-restraint, through its 
ability to say “no” to the demands of special interest groups, its ability to credibly 
commit itself to universal moral principles of the rule of law enshrined in a privilege-
free economic constitution. I shall come back to the role of the state which according 
to neo-liberals was mainly to enforce fair and equal rules of just behaviour which in 
the economic realm meant rules that allow open competition to unfold. But why was 
competition so important? What is its virtue?  
4. The ethics of competition 
It is very clear that for the ordo-liberals of the Freiburg School (as well as their neo-
liberal friends such as Röpke, Müller-Armack or Erhard), competition was an essential 
tool to be used for social and ethical purposes, namely the benefit of the large masses 
of consumers via the emasculation of private power of producers. In order to discuss 
the ethics of competition in a more systematic and broader, but still rather rough, 
framework it might for the present purpose be useful to distinguish three to four 
dimensions of ethical judgements: Ethical praise as attributed to (1a) good intentions 
(deontological ethics), (1b) virtuous behaviour (virtue ethics), (2) just, law-abiding 
behaviour according to universalisable rules of just conduct or (3) desirable results 
(consequentialism). Good will, virtue, justice, and welfare may be categories roughly 
corresponding to these dimensions. I am certainly oversimplifying moral philosophy 
and ethics to a degree that reflects the limits of both my competence and the purpose 
of this paper (which is to broadly illustrate some ethical standpoints of some neo-
liberal thinkers). Since I am here mainly concerned with social institutions and prac-
tices, differences between deontological and virtue ethics do not seem to me as rele-
______________________________ 
muth 2000 for more details). Mises, as already the documentation of the Colloque reveals, differs 
from all other protagonists mentioned here (including his student Hayek) by basing an uncom-
promising anti-statist view on an aprioristic logic. Mises clearly is the “odd man out” and thus 
shall not be counted amongst the original “neo-liberal” views presented here. 
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vant here. The point I try to make here is that a neo-liberal view of the “ethics of 
competition” relates to all ethical dimensions mentioned above, but it stresses an 
“institutional ethics” or “rights-egalitarianism” that relies on commonly acceptable 
rules that tend, overall, to enable and reward virtuous behavior and produce desirable 
social consequences.6
4.1 Competition and virtue, justice or welfare 
What made economics (and the classical liberalism that developed along with it) to be 
commonly regarded as a somewhat “immoral”, “dismal” science7 was its reluctance to 
put much faith in and emphasis on the first criteria named above: good intentions or 
benevolence8. To be sure, economics as a social science started with Adam Smith 
(1759/1982) and thus with “moral sentiments” both as empirical facts to be taken into 
account in positive analysis and as praiseworthy demands in a normative context. But, 
as economists discovered then and would in principle maintain until today, good 
intentions, benevolence or virtue alone could neither guarantee justice nor welfare in 
an extensive order of coordination within large groups composed mainly of unknown, 
invisible, strangers. Here, it could only be an “invisible hand”, the incentive structure 
of competitive selection led by abstract rules of procedural justice (the second crite-
rion), which made it possible that no recourse to benevolence was needed for an open 
market economy to yield desirable results or welfare (the third criterion) for multi-
tudes of unknown others.  
This general logic was expressed in the immortal quote of Adam Smith (1776/1976: 
26f.):
“[E]very individual necessarily labours to render the annual revenue of the society 
as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public in-
terest, nor knows how much he is promoting it (…) [B]y directing [his] industry in 
such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intents only his own 
gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote 
an end which was no part of his intention (…) By pursuing his own interest he 
frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really in-
tends to promote it.”  
________________________ 
6  This view has also been labelled “Ordnungsethik” (e.g. Homann/Kirchner 1995). For a political-
philosophical way to lay a foundation of liberalism in “egalitarian human rights” and their expres-
sion in universalisable rules of just conduct, see Kersting (2004, 2006). For a defence of “individ-
ual ethics” based on internalized moral values or self chosen internal norms (1a and 1b above) 
and a critique of (purely) incentive-oriented “institutional ethics” (2 above), see e.g. Weise (2000).  
7  Another irony of intellectual history is that the branding of economics as the „dismal science“ 
originated from Thomas Carlyle, who, in a text on the “Negro question” published in 1849, at-
tacked classical liberal economists for their anti-slavery standpoints and for a market egalitarian-
ism that denied common notions of superior races or classes in society. Also Charles Dickens 
contributed to the bad image of economics and capitalism derived from a similar paternalistic and 
elitist standpoint (see Levy 2001). 
8  As in the case of Mandeville (1732/1998), even commonly proclaimed virtues were not necessar-
ily endorsed if it could be shown that private vices could lead to public benefits. 
zfwu 9/1 (2008), 69-87 75
It is well known that, already in Smith’s system the desirable social results of self-
regarding intentions depended, especially in a large society, on the invisible hand’s being 
held by a visible arm of the rule of law, i.e. on market behaviour framed by commonly 
accepted rules of just behaviour (e.g. Homann 2006: 6f.). The latter aspect has indeed 
been disregarded within economics for too long. 
Neo-classical economists in the early 20th century tried hard to (dis-)prove what they 
took for Smith’s claim of the invisible but beneficial hand. However, with the tools of 
modern price theory and welfare-economics, it could be shown that only under im-
possible assumptions insuperable collective welfare results could be derived from 
“perfect competition”. This ideal-type affords, amongst other technicalities, that there 
are countless, and still representative, omniscient actors both on the demand side and 
the supply side of a market for homogenous goods. Perhaps some of the disgust many 
intellectuals today feel towards “neo-liberalism” can be attributed to their having been 
exposed only to the most rudimentary – and rudest – textbook-versions of “neo-
classical” economics and the perfectly unreal model of perfect competition. But most 
original neo-liberals’ views on the virtue of competition were developed either before 
or in explicit opposition to the neo-classical construct of “perfect” competition as a 
paradigmatic benchmark of social welfare (see e.g. Kirzner 1994).  
By discarding the fact of individual ignorance and by abstracting from social institu-
tions, economics offered a scapegoat that was all too easy to either discard as useless 
or to use as an alibi for interventionist corrections of all too obvious real market 
failure (if compared to the economists’ Nirvana). By disregarding both human condi-
tion and socially devised constraints to human actions, orthodox neo-classical eco-
nomics also bid farewell to any useful discourse on practical ethics. The game of 
utilitarian calculus played amongst armchair economists who would move representa-
tive actors equipped with given knowledge, goods and preferences on an imaginary 
drilling ground of welfare functions is of neither practical nor moral significance.9
Already for the “classical-liberal” Adam Smith, and then again for the “neo-liberal” 
thinkers of the 1930s, it was not the “unfettered market” or “competition” as such 
that miraculously transformed even wicked intentions into socially beneficial out-
comes. Rather, it was the second ethical criterion – justice of behaviour according to 
universal rules – that was a necessary condition for competition to provide commonly 
desirable results. And justice of behaviour towards unknown others had to become a 
matter of equality before the law. “Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité”: the battle-cry of the 
French Revolution demarks a magic triangle of ethics to which liberalism (old or new) 
offers no simplistic catch-all answer – for good reasons.  
________________________ 
9  See Zelizer (2007: 11): “views of the economy as an autonomous, distinctive sphere of human 
acitivity organized around rationality and efficiency have impeded the serious consideration of 
morality’s place in economic life”. See also Kersting (2006: 39ff.) on the limited (but still useful) 
value of using “homo oeconomicus” as a “worst-case scenario” for a prudent constitutional cal-
culus, but as an impossible candidate for a justification of morality as such. Kersting argues that 
the morals of just cooperation only work within a context of moral understandings that, in cases 
of conflict, value morality higher than instrumental rationality. Even if an interest in reciprocal 
morality can be assumed, morality itself cannot be based in interest: “Wir können Moral nicht in 
Interesse fundieren, wir können aber ein Interesse an der Moral nehmen” (ibid.: 43). 
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Only within the natural bonds of the small group (brothers and sisters, family and 
friends) can “fraternity” (or benevolence, or virtue) be exerted by oneself and ex-
pected from others10. In order to remain “virtuous”, benevolence or solidarity must be 
voluntary. As Adam Smith (1759/1982: 78f.) notes in his work on “moral senti-
ments”: “beneficence is always free, it cannot be extorted by force”; and: “[t]here is, 
however, another virtue (…) which may be extorted by force (…) This virtue is 
justice”. And it is here that equality has its proper place and can be extended to 
anonymous societies. Equality is a necessary attribute of justice (and the law) only if it 
means equal demands on just behaviour of everyone. This includes “equal rights” and 
precludes “equal results” (equal distribution of income or of power) as criteria of 
justice (Hayek 1976: 67ff.). “Liberty” thus means both the prerequisite of unforced 
(thus virtuous) fraternity and the consequence of legally enforceable (thus just) equal-
ity before the law. And competition according to rules of just behaviour would be-
come a morally justified demand of intended equality (before the law) with unintended 
results of benevolence (after the fact). 
In order to substantiate this claim in a more structured way, I now discuss three 
possible ethical vindications of competition, all of which are interlinked and overlap-
ping for good reasons in most “neo-liberal” arguments: Competition as a result and 
expression of individual liberty and private autonomy (liberté), competition as a result 
and a cause of the emasculation of privileged (market) power (égalité), and competi-
tion as a source of unintended good works for unknown others (fraternité). 
4.2 Competition as a result of equal liberty 
In a most fundamental liberal, even natural-liberty-based, justification, competition 
can be based on equal liberty. Fréderic Bastiat, in his essay on “Economic Harmonies” 
(Bastiat 1850/1996: ch. 10.8) claims that although competition “is often harsh in its 
operation, there is no law that is richer in social harmonies”. To identify competition 
with harmony is certainly a challenging statement that not many of Bastiat’s contem-
porary compatriots would dare to make. But for him competition is simply a result of 
“the absence of oppression” and hence the most natural expression of freedom, of the 
“possibility of choosing, of judging, of comparing” (ibid.: ch. 10.4). This shows that 
the framing of academic discourse or, for that matter, public opinion polls on the 
merits of competition is crucial. Answers critically depend on the alternative that is 
being offered or insinuated: competition vs. oppression/monopoly/privilege or 
competition vs. cooperation/solidarity. I guess that the same people who would in 
abstract terms prefer cooperation to rivalry would also prefer competition to monop-
oly, open calls for papers and invitations for tenders to nepotism, competitive sports 
to “fixed” games or, for that matter, democracy to autocracy. 
________________________ 
10  There are some famous exceptions to this rule of an inverse relation between effective fraternity, 
solidarity or love (caritas) and the size and anonymity of those to which these noble feelings are 
intended to apply. Mahatma Ghandi, e.g., did succeed in implementing an ethical approach 
among many people for some time. A really effective relief from poverty for the masses in India 
and the growing chances to determine their own way of pursuing happiness, however, might 
have more to do with the unintended emergence of “globalisation” or with the mutually benefi-
cial “business model” of granting micro-credits to the poor. 
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Competition in the Bastiat-frame would not only be the most natural consequence of 
scarce resources and rewards (see Mises 1949/1966: 273ff.), it could also be regarded a 
most natural expression of freedom (which I would count amongst ethical social 
values) – and freedom more for those who are able to choose and compare than for 
those who are, by command of the choosers, “forced” to produce at profit. Competi-
tion serves the needs of consumers much more than the interests of producers. This 
has been the battle cry already of 18th and 19th centuries’ liberals: Get rid of the feudal 
and mercantilist privileges! Oppression of competition means barred market entry, 
cartels, monopoly (often enough created or protected by the state). Oppression of 
competition means oppression of individuals’ equal freedom to exercise their talents 
and pursue their own goals by using their own, personal, knowledge. 
Other than Bastiat, but also Hayek (1960) or Friedman/Friedman (1981), Amartya 
Sen has never been content with an exclusively “negative” definition of freedom from 
coercion or freedom to choose. He endorses a much wider notion of “freedoms” that 
would also include positive, material, notions of capability to act and “freedom to 
achieve” (Sen 1994: 125). This is not the place to go into the details of Sen’s various 
definitions of “positive liberties” as “capabilities” (e.g. Sen 1993). But his claim that 
“we have to go well beyond the space of utilities – and beyond ‘efficiency’ in that 
space – to assess the market-mechanism” (Sen 1994: 124) is quite in line with the 
(historically correct) “neo-liberal” or “ordo-liberal” attitude and it is similarly dis-
tanced from Chicago-style or Misesian, economistic or a-priori, foundations of most 
forms of “neo”-libertarianism. But note that Sen’s own assessment of market-
competition leads him to claim that it is at least “weakly efficient in terms of achieve-
ment-freedoms” (ibid.: 130).
Indeed, any kind of “strong efficiency proof” in terms of achieved welfare can only be 
provided by ways of all-too-strong assumptions that are never “reality-proof”. Some 
aspects of the model of “perfect competition” have already been rejected above as 
obsolete for a neo-liberal argument and they were, in fact, fiercely rejected by original 
neo-liberals. Especially the assumption of “given” and “complete” information of 
market actors contradicts the later developed neo-liberal vindication of competition as 
a “discovery procedure” (Hayek 1968/1978), which only makes sense under condi-
tions of imperfect and scattered information that can be made socially beneficial only 
under conditions of free price-formation in a competitive market-process. 
However, as soon as the neoclassical assumption of “representative actors” is also 
rightfully dropped, one of the things to be discovered by competition is that under 
rules of equal negative freedom to choose unequal results for unequally lucky and able 
market participants necessarily and drastically emerge. Thus, competition as such 
provides little comfort for the fact that “the disabled, the old, or the handicapped may 
have, on the one hand, more difficulty in being able to get a good job and to earn a 
decent income, and on the other, also to face greater difficulties in converting incomes 
into capabilities to live well” (Sen 1994: 131). Indeed, free competition only relies on 
equal chances in the sense of equal (negative) freedom for all to try and transform 
their efforts into personal well-being. It thus also tends to transform unequal capabili-
ties into unequal chances to succeed in the sense of “positive freedoms” to achieve 
nearly as much as the more capable or lucky others. 
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The “weak efficiency” of a competitive order thus cannot in any way provide equally 
positive freedom and well-being for all. This is its primary weakness, but also its 
strength; since without free competition, there should be less available remedies for 
unfortunate distress, as the following two chapters try to show. The comparatively 
strong inefficiency (and often injustice) of monopolies and cartels should even be 
worse for the handicapped poor11. This is why neo-liberals seek to find solutions to 
obvious hardships not through interfering with the price-mechanism or curtailing 
competition. Rather, the causes of social distress had to be addressed by ways of 
unprivileged access to primary basic goods such as education, health care and entre-
preneurial activity (similar opportunities)12. And the effects of remaining inabilities to 
earn market incomes and enjoy a humane standard of living had to be addressed by 
direct transfers of services and/or money to those in need instead of measures aimed 
at distorting the competitive price-mechanism.13 No serious qualification of equal 
(negative) freedom to compete has to arise from social insurance schemes equally 
applicable to all. 
4.3 Competition and the emasculation of unsocial power 
“Equal freedom” or the “denial of all privilege”14 can be seen as primary ethical 
demands – with competition, the equal opportunity to access markets, being a most 
natural consequence. At the same time, competition can be ethically valuable not only 
as a consequence of ethical standards and rules of procedural justice, but also by virtue 
of its (unintended) consequences. The two aspects – moral/ethical “input” and 
moral/ethical “output” – are often hard to distinguish. This is especially true for the 
neo-/ordo-liberal view of competition as an answer to the “social question”. Neo- or 
ordo-liberals considered (not only: but all too often state-protected) cartels and mo-
nopolies to be the major source of the “new social question” (Eucken 1951: 56 ff.), 
because such artificial prevention of open competition tended to deprive not only 
________________________ 
11  See Eucken (1951: 63) who notes that “distribution can be particularly unequal and unjust where 
economic power is concentrated and, besides, bound up with administrative power”. 
12  The Rawlsian tone is quite intended. One of the many interpretations of his famous “Theory of 
Justice” (Rawls 1971) could also be somewhat “neo-liberal” (see, e.g. Karsten 1985). Even Hayek 
(1976: xiii) argues that “we agree on what is to me the essential point”, and refers to the following 
quote by Rawls (1963: 102): “the principles of justice define the crucial constraints which institu-
tions and joint activities must satisfy (…) If these constraints are satisfied, the resulting distribu-
tion, whatever it is, may be accepted as just (or at least not unjust).” 
13  This is not the place to discuss the major contractarian justifications of even compulsory social 
insurance schemes as proposed e.g. by Hayek (1960: ch. 19), Vanberg (2005/2008) or Rawls 
(1971). In all these concepts, equal freedom to compete is seen as a necessary condition for pro-
moting the wealth of the greatest numbers, but not a sufficient condition for avoiding social 
hardships of the handicapped or very unlucky. Thus, a liberal society is well-advised to insure all 
of its members against the risks of severe hardships and to provide a minimum income and 
maximum dignity for the least advantaged.  
14  See Hayek (1972: ix): “The essence of the liberal position (…) is the denial of all privilege, if 
privilege is understood in its proper and original meaning of the State granting and protecting 
rights to some which are not available on equal terms to others.” 
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potential rival producers, but also consumers and workers of viable alternatives to the 
conditions dictated by the privileged and powerful few.  
Thus, if Eucken (1951: 40) claims that the “problem of power is the obverse aspect of 
the problem of freedom” and that the “Wettbewerbsordnung” (order of rules enforcing 
open competition) is the key to solving both problems simultaneously, he has in mind 
several interrelations between competition, power and freedom: (a) Unlimited free-
dom does not lead to open competition, but becomes a major source of power and 
privilege15. (b) Legal privilege breeds economic power and economic power breeds 
political privilege; both tend to violate equal freedom as well as open competition. (c) 
Competitive market entry and rivalry tends to contest and reduce socially harmful 
positions of market power; thus: (d) Universalisable rules that define fair and equal 
rights of market-behaviour tend to simultaneously ease the problem of self-destructive 
freedom and the problem of self-preserving power positions. 
In short: the main moral “output” the ordo-liberals were focussing on was the in-
crease of individual autonomy and liberty as a result of the “emasculation of power” 
created by competition enforced by the rule of law. In this sense, Böhm (1971/2008: 
306, my translation) argued: “the great importance of competition is by no means just 
that of an incentive-mechanism, but rather that of an instrument to abolish power 
(…) [N]ot only the level of performance and growth, (…) but also the substance of 
freedom, equilibrium and justice of the market system depends on competition.” In 
Böhm’s quote as well as in views commonly held amongst intellectuals or politicians 
“performance and growth” seem rather secondary candidates for ethical praise com-
pared to “freedom and justice”. Behind these economic “incentive mechanisms” and 
the material goods they help create, one can, however, in a system based on market 
competition, discover one very peculiar moral good: unintended altruism. 
4.4 Competition and unintended altruism 
The beneficial material consequences of a market economy based on both open 
market access and universalisable rules of just conduct have already been alluded to. 
And indeed, they are not only a recurrent finding of the latest empirical cross-country 
findings over time.16 They have already been the essential part of Scottish moral 
philosophy informed by basic economics in the 18th century. Neo-liberals such as most 
of those assembled at the Colloque Lippmann did not attack classical liberalism 
because of its claim that competitive markets would indeed lead to the best possible 
provision of consumer goods – from essential nutrition needed to feed an enormously 
growing population to things that first were luxury goods for a fanciful few and soon 
became objects of mass-production catering for popular demand. Neo-liberals and all 
other sorts of intellectuals rather became disillusioned about 19th and 20th century 
forms of what also Marxians decried as “state-monopoly capitalism” in which privi-
________________________ 
15  The standard example used by the ordo-liberals was the vindication of cartel-arrangements based 
on the principle of “freedom to contract” which historically were even given legal protection by 
German courts. Such contracts to the detriment of third parties create market power and infringe 
on the freedom of others to compete (see Eucken 1951: 31f.). 
16  See, e.g. the data-series in “Economic Freedom in the World” (Heritage Foundation 2008).  
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leges were granted by the state to powerful captains of industry and in which cartel-
arrangements were given legal licence and political support.  
As soon as such state protection of powerful industrialists and interest-groups would 
be abandoned, most neo-liberals might have been ready to re-embrace the “old”, 
classical-liberal view as has been vigorously expressed, e.g., by Hayek17 in his refined 
consequentialist argument: “The morals of the market do lead us to benefit others, 
not by our intending to do so, but by making us act in a manner which will, neverthe-
less have just that effect. Our ‘altruism’, in this new sense, is very different from 
instinctual altruism. No longer the end pursued but the rules observed make the 
action good or bad” (Hayek 1988: 81). This unintended altruism triggered by rules and 
incentives is both a cause and an effect of the growth of society once it turned from 
the naturally closed society of hunter-gatherer tribes (or the artificially closed society 
of central planning) to the “extended order” (Hayek 1988: 38ff.) or “open society” 
(Popper 1945/1966): “It did become the ethos of the Open Society that it was better 
to invest one’s fortune (…) to cater for the needs of thousands of unknown people 
rather than to provide for the needs of a few known neighbours” (Hayek 1976: 145). 
This is not a minor social achievement. At the same time, it has always been a source 
of moral indignation. After all, intrinsically moral aspects of the particular needs 
themselves are no essential part of the “catering”. In a competitive market economy, 
Adam Smith (1776/1976: 660) found, “it is perfectly self-evident” that “consumption 
is the sole end and purpose of production”. What is being consumed for what reasons 
by whom is of little concern for competing producers. Their “altruism”, thus, is not 
only unintended, it is also un-paternalistic as it does not judge the ethical value of the 
wants that are satisfied. This has led Frank Knight (1922: 580) to argue that, from an 
ethical standpoint, “we cannot accept want-satisfaction as a final criterion of value” 
and we cannot evade an ethical evaluation based on a “desire for wants of the ‘right’ 
kind”. Knight’s deontological standard of ethics based on the “character of the motive 
which led to the action” (ibid.: 621) or the “Christian ideal of spiritual friendship” 
(ibid.: 622) does indeed provide no ethical justification of competition, narrowly 
defined as an anonymous mechanism of non-discriminating want-satisfaction. Com-
petition in that regard is at best ethically neutral; although it is derived from the same 
liberal principles which leave self-directed individuals free to choose amongst alterna-
tive lives, without which, according to Knight, “there is no such thing as ethics”. 18
The individual ethics of having the “right” wants has to be created and promoted 
“beyond the realm of supply and demand”, as forcefully argued also by the neo-liberal 
Wilhelm Röpke (1958). In a similar vein, and rightly distinguishing levels of appropri-
________________________ 
17  Even more vigorous were, of course, the rather libertarian views of Ludwig von Mises 
(1927/2005) and his followers such as Rothbard (1970). By regarding the state not as a potential 
facilitator, but as a natural enemy of freedom and justice, they should not (and would not have 
wanted to) be counted amongst the proponents of a neo- or ordo-liberal agenda. 
18  See Knight (1922: 618): “Ethics deals with the problem of choosing between different kinds of 
life, and assumes that there is real choice between different kinds, or else there is no such thing as 
ethics. The ethical character of competition is not decided by the fact that it stimulates a greater 
amount of activity; this merely raises the question of the ethical quality of what is done or of the 
motive itself.” 
zfwu 9/1 (2008), 69-87 81
ate supply of different kinds of morals, H.B Acton (1993: 12) states: “Competitive 
capitalism, then, gives scope for self-directed individuals to set up and keep produc-
tion going. What is produced depends upon what the consumers want. What they 
want depends upon how well they have been brought up. If they have been well 
brought up, their patterns of demand will be morally acceptable. If they have been 
badly brought up, their patterns of demand will be morally unacceptable”. In short, 
the market is no substitute for moral education. But competitive capitalism, if justly 
framed by adequate rules, provides strong incentives to learn at least that one can best 
benefit oneself by benefiting others (see e.g. Baurmann 1996). 
5. The “competitive order” and the state 
As argued above, a neo-liberal “ethos” of competition with its consequences of unin-
tended but enormous benefits was primarily based on general rules of just behaviour. 
Without such common rules neither commonly accepted behaviour nor commonly 
desired results of competition can be expected to emerge spontaneously. This is the 
core conviction of “classical neo-liberals”. However, with the transition towards the 
“Open Society”, the standards of justice had to become more abstract and, in a sense, 
more loose in order to reflect the increasing numbers of those who would be able and 
willing to adhere to these rules – and in order to produce the ever more unlimited 
effect of unintended altruism granted to strangers: “the new morals of the Open 
Society (…) not only indefinitely extended the circle of other people in relation to 
whom one had to obey moral rules, but (…) this expansion of the scope of the moral 
code necessarily brought with itself a reduction of its content” (Hayek 1976: 146). 
The “Open Society” has never been regarded as a natural, anarchic phenomenon. Its 
very existence and its beneficial social consequences depend on clearly defined prop-
erty rights (including obligations such as liability) and institutions, that is: commonly 
shared rules and procedures enforced by a credible threat of sanctions for those who 
expect an advantage by breaking the rules. As an enforcement-mechanism the nation-
state with its almost “natural monopoly” (Wohlgemuth 2000) of ideally legitimate 
coercion has for a few centuries been the strongest candidate if the “Open Society” 
was to be defended against its “enemies” (Popper 1945/1966). But at the same time, 
historically, “the role of the state was at best ambiguous, because the state was as 
often an increasing source of insecurity and higher transaction costs as it was protec-
tor and enforcer of property rights” (North 1990: 35). 
Thus, when it comes to state-market (or more broadly: state-society) relations, the 
common “neo-liberal” view is that the state would and should be able to enforce 
exactly those rules that a private-law-society might, in principle, be able to “culturally” 
develop on its own, but that could be more efficiently and equitably enforced by a 
third party with enough strength (based on increasing returns to scale) and enough 
distance (based on its not being a market actor itself) to do the job.19 The whole 
________________________ 
19  It would unduly prolong this paper if I were to discuss all neo-liberal or classical liberal assertions 
of this claim. On the relation between a “private law society” and a protective state, see e.g. 
Böhm (1966/1989). Between traditional ordo-liberalism and the later rejuvenation of the 
“Freiburg School” after Hayek brought less static and statist ideas to Freiburg, Böhm’s work pro-
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question of state-market relations thus depends on the trust that one can have in the 
state’s ability to enforce universalisable rules of just behaviour. The answer, in turn, 
depends on how politicians administrating the natural monopoly of coercion can 
credibly commit themselves to rules governing their own behaviour. Such rules are 
manifold and may be crudely summarised under two headings: democracy and the rule 
of law. Modern neo-liberals believe in both as long as they serve, in combination, to 
lead political authorities to act as agents of their principals (the citizens) in their (the 
citizens’) pursuit of realising “gains from joint commitment” (Vanberg 2005: 27) 
which private initiatives would often fail to realise. 
Both democracy and the rule of law – and the combination of the two – seem to be 
the most particular “cultural” achievements that Europe, during many centuries of 
disastrously testing the opposites, has produced. Markets (and thus consumers and 
entrepreneurs) have prospered mostly in times when leaders of the state were able to 
live up to their credible commitment to the rule of law protecting private property and 
free competition – quite often against their own short-term political self-interest. The 
very incentive for such a socially beneficial commitment was itself the product of 
political competition! Such political competition can, again, take two civilised forms: 
democracy or federalism (within nation states) and/or inter-jurisdictional competition 
(between nation states). Historically, it has been the latter – competition between 
jurisdictions trying to offer more hospitable conditions for private enterprise – that 
has been a major source of economic wealth – especially on the European continent. 
In addition, this competition amongst innumerable European principalities also 
rewarded jurisdictions that were able to credibly commit themselves to constitutional 
provisions providing both democracy and the rule of law20.
6. Neo-liberalism and the construction of Europe 
The idea that the nation-state was to be the sole best guardian of a neo-liberal “Wettbew-
erbsordnung” was challenged very soon after WW II and with the first attempts to 
create a European Economic Community (EEC). Influential neo-liberals were at that 
time – the mid 1950s – mostly Germans. An EEC of only six states from the free 
“West”, and inspired, as it must have seemed at the time, by French desires for com-
prehensive (supra-)state-interventionism, was for neo-liberals (such as the German 
Minister of Economic Affairs, Ludwig Erhard, and his most outspoken advisor, 
Wilhelm Röpke) an imminent threat to their aspirations both nationally and interna-
tionally. This is not the place to retrace the delicate situation and the ardent debates of 
that time21. But little over 50 years after the Treaty of Rome was signed, some prelimi-
______________________________ 
vides a very useful link (see Streit/Wohlgemuth 2000). Böhm had two advantages: he lived much 
longer than, e.g., Eucken; and he was a legal scholar, not an economist. Thus, he was able to de-
velop a broad view of neo-liberal legal philosophy without being distracted by ephemeral fash-
ions of neo-classical economic modeling. 
20  On the intellectual legacy of and empirical advocacy for “institutional competition” in which 
citizens can satisfy their political preferences by ways of “exit”, see the manifold sources in Vau-
bel (2008). 
21  See Wohlgemuth (2008a) for a more detailed account of the early stages of European integration 
and the partly frustrated hopes and partly refuted fears of neo-liberals. 
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nary conclusions of the effect of neo-liberalism (in the historical and not in the po-
lemic sense) on the construction of Europe seem possible. 
Germany has not only been the European “export champion” in terms of goods and 
services (for most of the last 50 years). Her most precious institutional “goods and 
services” of older, neo-liberal days, have meanwhile been “Europeanised” to a stun-
ning degree: stable currency, free trade, and “unfettered competition”. All these 
policy-fields have, meanwhile, been completely or largely “outsourced” to the Euro-
pean Central Bank, the European Commission or European Court of Justice. By 
being more effectively protected from the demands of national special interests and 
the logic of pleasing minority-coalitions in order to overcome re-election constraints, 
these agencies have often been able to defend “neo-liberal” principles more effectively 
than national governments would have been able to. 
At the same time, however, especially by ways of in-transparent log-rolling within the 
European Council and bureaucratic ambitions within the European Commission, 
European Courts, European Committees and the European Parliament, the EU has 
been a major producer of an “acquis communautaire” of interventions and regulations 
that often cannot be argued to be universally “just” or preferable by taking the in-
creasing heterogeneity of individual opinions or interests into account (see Wohlge-
muth/Brandi 2007, Alesina et. al 2001). When speculating about the political-
economic “conditions of inter-state federalism” in Europe, Hayek (1939/1948) was 
remarkably enthusiastic about such a project, at a time when such hopes were certainly 
doomed. But, theoretically he had a point, and with the benefit of historical hindsight, 
he was partly proven right. Hayek argued that democratically organized nation states 
would find their mutual benefits of joint commitment mostly in the area of negative 
liberties: “securing peace” (ibid.: 255), the “free movement of men and capital” (ibid.: 
258), reduced privileges and state-interventionism (ibid.: 262f.). In short: “in the 
international sphere, democratic government should only be possible if the tasks of 
the international government are limited to an essentially liberal program” (ibid.: 
271).22
7. Outlook: Competing institutional variety as Europe’s “Social Model” 
In this paper, I have tried to neither reproduce nor comment on the well known and 
heavily publicized discussion on “European Social Models”23. Instead, I wanted to 
outline just one candidate for a truly “European” model of state-market relations. The 
ironic twist is that the label which can with historical correctness be attached to it is 
also the momentarily most contested and even detested one in Europe: “neo-
liberalism”. What I presented was neo-liberalism as “invented” 1938 in Paris during a 
conference of mostly European thinkers trying to prevent the fatal demise of Euro-
pean culture and liberty which occurred only one year later. And it was this neo- or 
________________________ 
22  As argued in more detail elsewhere (Wohlgemuth 2008a), Hayek’s idealist neo-liberal reasoning 
might have been conceptually right; but he was quite naive concerning political tactics and the 
logic of log-rolling that produced some 90 000 pages of European legal provisions that involve 
quite a lot of mutually traded privileges.  
23  See Esping-Andersen (1990) for the most quoted trigger of the academic and political debate. 
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ordo-liberalism which after 1948 started as a “German Social Model” which produced 
the so-called “Wirtschaftswunder” that became envied all over Europe. And it is this 
neo-liberalism that found its way into the core of the Roman Treaties in 1957 (apart, 
obviously, from certain parts such as agricultural policy).  
Thus in a certain, but limited sense, one could argue that neo-liberalism actually was a 
“European Social Model”. The universal rules of just conduct that guarantee free 
movement and open competition and prevent discriminatory state intervention have 
to some degree been successfully “Europeanised”. However, the European Union and 
its member states go far beyond the neo-liberal definitions of core state responsibili-
ties. And those seeking to define a “European Social Model” mostly want the EU to 
go well beyond the completion of the internal market. They want labour market 
policies, welfare policies or tax policies to be further “harmonised” within the EU. In 
this way, “old Europe” may be trying to protect its paternalistic welfare-states which 
have come under stress from global competition.  
Collectivist “social models” such as socialism and fascism were originally invented and 
tested in the very heart of Europe (and mostly in Germany) not too long ago. At the 
same time, Europe can historically claim to have been the often shaken cradle of a 
very fruitful offspring called “Western” civilisation – a legacy of Greek democracy and 
philosophy, Roman law and citizenship, Christian ethics, British Rule of Law, French 
and German enlightenment – however debatable such exclusive attributions may be 
from a historical perspective24. But such “shaking”, exploring, testing, adopting and 
rejecting, has, over many centuries, also shaped Europe and made it strong, innovative 
and exciting. It has been the competition amongst principalities, states, religions, 
schools of thought, and thus of laws, institutions, policies, social practices, that pro-
duced the “European miracle” (Jones 2003).
This “institutional competition” can work very much like market competition as a 
socially beneficial “discovery procedure” and learning process (Wohlgemuth 2008b). 
It is a most useful procedure once we acknowledge politicians’ and citizens’ constitu-
tional lack of knowledge concerning present and future social problems and adequate 
political responses. In addition, decentralisation and inter-jurisdictional competition 
are the only ways to account for the fact that citizens have different and changing 
preferences also concerning the “social models” that they will have to finance and 
endure. Institutional competition is no equaliser or “ex post harmoniser”. It is a 
permanent process of creating, comparing and adopting different responses to differ-
ent needs, capabilities, and preferences. Just like competition described here, also 
peaceful rivalry for best solutions amongst jurisdictions is the expression of equal 
liberty, it reduces (political) power, and is another beneficial source of progress and 
wealth (see also Rosenberg/Birdzell 1986).  
The “ethics of competition” may historically have been a unique European “inven-
tion” – successfully exported some time ago to Northern America and increasingly 
adopted today in many parts of the globalised world. The irony of history may be that 
we Europeans are now trying to fend off global competition, our own invention that 
________________________ 
24  See Nemo (2005) for a forcefully „Euro-centric“ definition of Western civilization and 
Nemo/Petitot (2007) for a comprehensive overview of the history of European liberalism. 
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made us grow and develop our own civilisation. The neo-liberal economist Wilhelm 
Röpke (1958: 365, my translation) was early aware of this danger:  
“If we wanted to try to organise Europe in a centralist way (…) and forge it into a 
more or less closed block, this would mean nothing less than to betray Europe 
and the European patrimony. It would be an all the more malicious betrayal since 
it is committed in the name of Europe by ways of a disdainful abuse of its name.”  
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